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FEA TURE
E PL URIB US UNUM: DATA AND
OPERATIONS INTEGRATION IN THE
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
W. David Ball*
INTRODUCTION
There is no single criminal justice "system" in California-just hundreds of
separate agencies, each with its own culture, organization, and data. Offenders
who are brought into "the system" are actually brought into several separate
systems as they are arrested by law enforcement, jailed by sheriffs, tried by
courts, sentenced to prison, and released into community supervision under
probation or parole. Given that each offender will travel through a number of
different agencies, integrated criminal justice seeks, at a minimum, to ensure
that information about each offender will travel along with him. For example,
once one agency learns that an offender needs psychiatric medications or that
he has a particular gang affiliation, other agencies who subsequently gain
custody of him should not spend time and resources rediscovering the same
information. Integration should ideally involve coordination of programming
and other interventions as well, so that an offender undergoing, say, drug and
alcohol treatment in one part of the system can simply resume his treatment
when he is transferred to a different part of the system.
It is difficult for the casual observer to understand just how hard it can be
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2007-2009. I would like to thank Bob Weisberg, Director, and Kara Dansky, Executive
Director, not only for the opportunity to pursue this work, but for their faith in giving me the
freedom to pull so long (and so single-mindedly) on this one loose thread. I could not have
written this Article without them. I would also like to thank all of the participants in the
Executive Sessions for their insights; this article draws heavily on what I learned, although
all errors and opinions are, of course, mine. I'd also like to thank Alexandra Lampert for her
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for criminal justice agencies-even ones in regular contact-to currently get
information from one another. Part of the problem of information management
is due to its scale: criminal justice is a core function of state and local
governments employing tens of thousands of people. Part of it is due to inertia:
different agencies have already developed their own recordkeeping programs
and their own idiosyncratic ways of coding standard types of information, and
those agencies that are connected typically do so via single-use databases,
which do not allow easy searches involving multiple parameters. I In a Google
era, where information on almost everything is easy to find, it can be shocking
to consider that answering basic questions about criminal populations (such as
how many people are serving what sentence for what crime) is not as simple as
logging into a computer, entering a password, and running a search. Given how
often basic questions need to be answered-and how important it is to know
the answers-the scope for improving the efficiency of criminal justice
administration is vast. Better information can make all interventions more
efficient and more targeted. Information can also help us, crucially, to analyze
which programs are working in the first place, and how, if at all, they can be
improved.
This Article reflects some of the insights from the Stanford Criminal
Justice Center's (SCJC's) year-long project on data and operations integration
1. This is true mostly of databases administered by the state, but it is not true of more
localized, peer-to-peer systems such as Coplink. For more on Coplink, see infra note 13 and
accompanying text.
2. I do not mean to be overly sanguine about data integration or to suggest that all
data integration is positive. A flood of information might swamp personnel or hide good
information amidst irrelevant information. Connecting individual databases into a
comprehensive one will also undoubtedly raise privacy concerns. Even though agencies are
currently authorized to collect, store, and disseminate criminal justice information to other
authorized agencies, the fact that such collection could be made easier--and more likely-in
an integrated system might be discomfiting even in the absence of a change in the governing
legal rules. The issue I address in this Article, however, is not whether integration should
occur, but how it should occur. By engaging with the subject and illustrating some of the
dynamics therein, I hope to help establish a common framework of understanding that is a
necessary prerequisite to discussing these other, crucial issues. As an initial matter, many of
the potential negative effects of integration could be dealt with through greater transparency.
While agencies are currently authorized to gather a lot of information about individuals, the
lack of integration means it is difficult for anyone-including the agencies themselves-to
discover how much information is collected across the system as a whole. Better data--and
better access to that data-can tell us more about the scope of current information collection
and could facilitate citizen participation in decisions about criminal justice (policies,
practices, and the amount of resources devoted to them). See, e.g., David A. Harris, How
Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce-or Replace-the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 149 (2009) (endorsing the tracking of law
enforcement search and seizure activity to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures); cf Max Minzner, Putting Probability
Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEx. L. REv. 913 (2009) (arguing that probable cause should
be analyzed empirically, based on data about an officer's success rates).
[Vol. 21:277
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in California's criminal justice system. The project employed the Executive
Sessions model first popularized by the Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard, where leaders from all area of criminal justice get together "to take
joint responsibility for rethinking and improving society's responses to an
issue."3 Every few months, judges, district attorneys, sheriffs, police chiefs,
public defenders, probation officers, court administrators, formerly incarcerated
persons, and nonprofits from across the state came to Stanford to participate in
a series of loosely moderated one-day sessions. Each session focused on a
particular subset of integration issues. Studying the problem from a combined
academic and practical perspective pointed out gaps between the theory and
practice. Our prescriptions-which were made in concert with practitioners-
reflected (or at least attempted to reflect) practical changes that were feasible
within the context of how criminal justice agencies actually conduct business.
Five sessions focused on integrated criminal justice4: a session introducing
the topic, 5 a session on the importance of the pre-sentence report,6 a session on
regional information sharing,7 a session on the ways in which integrated
criminal justice might improve outcomes for an inmate's first seventy-two
hours of release after prison,8 and a final session on the use of Risk-Needs
Assessments (RNAs) in managing local custodial populations.9 Each session
involved a multitude of participants speaking on complex topics; the
conversations did not limit themselves to a single valence or a single
conclusion. Because the reports from each session were posted to the SCJC
3. Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at the Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, Executive Sessions, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/
criminaljustice/executive_sessions/index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
4. Three earlier Executive Sessions focused on sentencing policy and corrections
reform.
5. See STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STANFORD LAW SCH., CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INFORMATION SHARING: ENHANCING EARLY INTERVENTION, MEASURING RESULTS (2007),
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/scjc/pdf/120707-Report-and_ Analysis lr.pdf.
6. See W. DAVID BALL & KARA DANsKY, STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR.,
STANFORD LAW SCH., COORDINATION AT THE FRONT-END OF SENTENCING: THE JUDICIARY,
PROBATION, AND THE PRE-SENTENCING REPORT (2008), http://www.law.stanford.edu/
program/centers/scjc/pdf/Crim_030708_Report_lr_071008.pdf.
7. See W. DAVID BALL, STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STANFORD LAW SCH.,
COUNTY TO COUNTY, AGENCY TO AGENCY: INFORMATION SHARING AND OPERATIONAL
COLLABORATION IN THE BAY AREA AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (2008),
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/scjc/pdf/June_Reportfor-.web lr.pdf.
8. See W. DAVID BALL ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STANFORD LAW
SCH., THE FIRST 72 HOURS OF RE-ENTRY: SEIZING THE MOMENT OF RELEASE (2008),
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/scjc/pdf/Seizing-the-Moment-Release-09120
8.pdf.
9. See W. DAVID BALL ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STANFORD LAW
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website,' 0 I will not recount all of the specific contours and conclusions of each
session.
This Article will, however, develop the fundamental takeaway from the
Executive Sessions: that better integration is not, primarily, a technology
problem. Although there are infrastructural and technological barriers to
integration, the main obstacles are organizational and conceptual. We cannot
build an integrated criminal justice system without first answering some thorny
questions. How do we define the boundaries of the network: by geography,
population, or patterns of criminal activity? What is the role of state and local
cooperation, and how can we overcome the mistrust between California's state
government and the governments of its fifty-eight counties? What metrics are
we using to evaluate programmatic success, and does everyone agree on the
policy implications of a particular metric? More broadly, how will the
collection and use of contemporaneous information shift criminal justice policy
and practice from a static to a dynamic model? All of these issues relate to
more than just criminal justice: what we learn from criminal justice integration
can guide us in other kinds of multiagency, multijurisdictional problems."
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I lays out some of the benefits
of an integrated system as a means of illustrating why law enforcement
agencies across the state are actively pursuing data integration. Part II discusses
three organizational and political obstacles to creating an integrated system:
defining what we mean by the criminal justice "system," drawing boundaries of
relevant networks, and resolving tensions among state and local agencies with
concurrent jurisdiction. Part III then discusses three ways in which integration
might have far-reaching implications on criminal justice policies, processes,
and principles: by defining metrics of success, by improving organizational
learning, and by isolating the goals of risk reduction and punishment.
I. THE BENEFITS OF AN INTEGRATED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Because the need for and scope of an integrated criminal justice system is
not readily apparent, this Part will outline the potential ways in which
integration might improve policies and procedures.
A typical offender passes through many different agencies after breaking
the law: law enforcement arrests him, a jail holds him pending bail or trial, the
courts accept his plea or try him, and he is sentenced to probation, jail, or
10. See sources cited supra notes 5-9.
11. Indeed, the analogy to the integration of national security information and
operations in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, is apt. For a discussion of this
issue, see Nathan Alexander Sales, Share and Share Alike: Intelligence Agencies,
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prison. Each agency typically has exhaustive policies and procedures governing
the physical transfer of the offender, but less thought is given to transferring the
information accompanying each person. Offenders are more than just bodies, of
course: agencies need to know who an offender is, what he has done, and what
particular risks and needs he presents. Integration could ensure that each
agency has common knowledge about an offender's risks and needs and a
common approach for addressing them that avoids needless duplication of
effort--or, even worse, counterproductive changes in approach.
In this Part, I will sketch out the ways in which integration could improve
the efficiency and accuracy of several core public safety functions:
investigation, sentencing, incarceration, and release. I conclude with a
discussion of the ways in which integration could lead to better system-wide
analyses and policies.
A. Investigation
Criminal activity is not confined to a single jurisdiction-an offender
doesn't have a map she uses to confine herself to a particular city or county
when committing crimes. The Bay Area, for example, has a number of what
might be called "BART crimes," where offenders take the BART subway
system to another jurisdiction, commit crimes, and return home. With better
information sharing among the counties BART connects, law enforcement
could, for example, more quickly and easily link a pawned piece of jewelry in
one county with a police report describing that jewelry in another county.
Currently, information sharing requires the establishment of joint task forces,
or, in individual cases, shot-in-the-dark phone calls to other agencies.
Systematizing data sharing would make local law enforcement more effective
in investigating and preventing criminal activity.
The state does collect and disseminate information, but the architecture is
based on a fundamental design that is more than thirty years old. The California
Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) began operation in
1970 and traffic has grown enormously since then.1 2 The system was designed
in an era before the Internet and, to some extent, suffers from the legacy of its
architecture, which requires special equipment to access databases that are
hosted separately from one another. A more modem approach would use
regular, multiuse computers over a secure connection, with databases that can
be more easily integrated with each other. Coplink 13 is a private, peer-to-peer
type system that allows users to search the contents of record management
12. See CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CLETS 2008 STRATEGIC PLAN § 2.7.2 (2008),
available at http://ag.ca.gov/meetings/pdf/2008-cletsstrategicplan.pdf.
13. See Coplink, Project Modules Overview, http://www.coplink.com/overview.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
2010]
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systems (RMSs) of neighboring agencies." While state databases allow users
to search a wider geographic area, the information in each of them is more
narrow, related to discrete offenses (e.g., domestic violence) or types of
offenders (e.g., gang members). 15 These databases do not allow users to search
easily across databases with multiple variables.
More detailed information can be invaluable, however, even when it does
not lend itself readily to a particular category. For example, an individual
agency might have information in its RMS about a gang member's street name,
tattoos, and physical attributes. Suppose a citizen in a neighboring jurisdiction
tells police that she heard that "Joker" committed a recent murder. Right now
there is no way for that officer to do a search on the street-name "Joker" to
associate it with a real name and address. The information is somewhere in the
system, but without information sharing there is no way to get it out.
B. Sentencing
The pre-sentence report (PSR) is a document prepared by a probation
officer that contains information relevant to a judge's sentencing decision. 6 In
California, PSRs must include details about the crime, the offender's criminal
record, victim information, and "[a]ny relevant facts concerning the
defendant's social history," including details about an offender's family,
education, employment, income, military service, medical/psychological
history, substance abuse, and any other relevant information. 17 Because such
information is also useful for treatment, classification, and programming, the
PSR has been used as the foundation for offender information management in
other states. In Virginia, for example, PSRs accompany an offender on his or
her subsequent stops through prison, parole, and reentry. 18 If an offender is
later rearrested, static components such as educational history on the PSR are
reused and updates about criminal activity and social history are made as
14. Coplink actually duplicates the data from RMSs and hosts it on a Coplink "node."
The contents of RMSs are uploaded to the node and the node handles user queries. See
Roslin V. Hauck et al., Using Coplink to Analyze Criminal-Justice Data, COMPUTER, Mar.
2002, at 30, 34.
15. See, e.g., Office of the Attorney General of the State of California, CJSC Data
Bases, http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/databss.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2009); see also
CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, § 2.7.1 ("The DOJ maintains several unique data base
applications, such as the Automated Criminal History System, Wanted Persons System,
Stolen Vehicle System, Automated Boat System, Automated Firearms System, Automated
Property System, Domestic Violence Restraining Order System, Supervised Released File,
the Missing and Unidentified Persons System, Mental Health Firearms Prohibition System,
Armed Prohibitive Persons System, and the Megan's Law.").
16. CAL. R. CT. 4.411(d).
17. CAL. R. CT. 4.411.5(a).
18. See VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 50-51 (2002),
available at http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/annualreport_2002.pdf.
[Vol. 21:277
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necessary. This results in an offender profile which is both easier to produce
and more comprehensive than a PSR written from scratch each time.
PSRs can also be combined with risk-needs assessments (RNAs). An RNA
is a brief screen designed to detect the presence of statistically significant
factors correlated with the risk of reoffending, as well as to detect needs that, if
treated, might reduce these risks. "Risks" might be dynamic factors, like
antisocial attitudes, or they might be static, such as age at first arrest. "Needs"
include everything from mental illness and substance abuse to assessments of
an individual's impulse control. An RNA provides a baseline for measuring the
effectiveness of subsequent criminal justice interventions. Using the
information in PSRs and RNA's could shorten the time it takes for a receiving
agency to process an offender and begin programming. A prison receiving a
new prisoner with a diagnosis of substance abuse could begin treatment as soon
as resources became available. Without this information, the prison would
needlessly delay appropriate treatment until it made its own redundant
diagnosis-if, in fact, it eventually diagnosed the condition at all. The result is
that treatment to address the causes of recidivism would be needlessly delayed.
PSRs could be used for more than just an individual's sentencing and
treatment, however. The aggregate data contained in PSRs as a whole could
provide a remarkable amount of information about the offender population in
general. This information could be used both to design new law enforcement
policies and to shed light on which current policies are or are not working.'
9
More accurate and detailed system-wide empirical information about actual
time served under particular sentences could inform a judge's decision about
the proper term to set within statutory boundaries. 20 System-wide data could
also aid judges in deciding whether probation or diversion into drug court or
mental health court for a given offender would be appropriate, and even
provide judges with real-time updates on how an offender is progressing in
court-ordered rehabilitation. This would allow judges to respond more
incrementally to setbacks in an offender's treatment, instead of waiting for him
19. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK
ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE EVALUATION (2002), available at
http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/risk-offrpt.pdf (evaluating a three-year pilot program that
tracked outcomes for risk-assessed offenders who got jail or alternative punishment).
20. Even in a completely advisory system, such as Missouri's, better information can
result in lower sentence disparities among judges. See Michael A. Wolff, Missouri's
Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing System, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 98 (2006)
(describing a sentencing system which recommends sentences based on the actual sentencing
practices of judges); see also id. at 118 (finding that actual sentences imposed are within
guidelines more than eighty percent of the time). One author has suggested that a similar
system be implemented at the federal level. See Mark William Osler, After the Implosion:
Trailing-Edge Guidelines for a New Era, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/ papers.cfin?abstractid=1397170 (suggesting that
real-time electronic surveys of federal sentences made available to federal judges would
promote uniformity while maintaining discretion).
2010]
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to return to court due to noncompliance.
Unfortunately, California has done little to capitalize on the PSR's
potential. Though a PSR must contain certain information, California has no
standard PSR format other than the requirement that each PSR be produced on
8.5-by- 1-inch paper.21 When it comes to information sharing, however, format
is more than just an afterthought. A PSR which is designed to be reread and
reused needs to minimize of hard-to-skim narrative sections and instead format
information in a way that would allow subsequent readers to get the gist of each
section quickly. For example, prior offenses might simply have a list of
constituent elements (e.g., cocaine sale, ten grams, concealed weapon) rather
than a narration of offense facts (e.g., "Defendant then went into his car to get
a small baggie of cocaine, later determined to contain ten grams."). Risks might
simply be listed in a series of tick boxes. The point is that PSRs should be
written with the expectation that they will be read and reused by others.
California PSRs are currently idiosyncratic records of a probation officer's
investigation and are of little use beyond sentencing. The state has made almost
no effort to standardize PSRs, and the information and format of PSRs is
sometimes different from judge to judge within the same jurisdiction. Indeed,
one participant argued that California's approach to probation ultimately
depends on which county one is in.
C. Incarceration
Integration of data concerning offenders' personal histories, coupled with
RNAs, could help streamline classification, programming, and reentry
programs. Currently, much of the information relevant to classification is
already collected during an offender's admission to jail, and more still is
collected during the compilation of the PSR. This information does not,
however, travel in a timely fashion to prison with the inmate. Instead, inmates
wait in prison intake centers for months before they are assigned to the prison
where they will begin serving their sentences. While in a prison intake center,
inmates cannot get started on their long-term rehabilitative programming.
Better information integration could reduce or eliminate these wait times.
Prisons particularly need better information about inmates' health. The
state prison system is currently under court-ordered receivership for
21. See CAL. R. CT. 4.411.5(b) (establishing that the information must follow the given
sequence "to the extent possible"). Participants in our March 2009 session, however,
reported that even the substantive PSR requirements were not always complied with: it is
apparently common practice in some jurisdictions to produce a "short form" PSR, with only
criminal history and information about the instant offense, not social history or other
information required by statute. Participants also reported that PSRs were not generated for
all offenders, even though a PSR is required by statute for every probation-eligible offense.
[Vol. 21:277
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unconstitutionally poor levels of health care provision; 22 getting health
information from jail intake screens would improve compliance and reduce
waiting times.23 Continuity of care is a crucial part of treatment. The prison
population tends to suffer from medical problems at greater rates than those
found in the general population,24 and timely treatment can often be a matter of
life and death. Even in less exigent circumstances, however, such information
will be desirable. Sometimes a prisoner himself will be unaware of his own
health problem: prisoners suffer from high rates of infectious diseases such as
tuberculosis, hepatitis C, and AIDS, which can spread more easily in crowded
penal institutions. Given that most prisoners eventually return to the
community, prison health issues can be more accurately described as public
health issues.
25
Mentally ill prisoners also present particular problems requiring a wide
variety of information and interagency cooperation, both within criminal justice
and between criminal justice and social services. If law enforcement officials
know that a potential arrestee has a mental illness, they can change their
approach in order to better ensure their safety, the public's safety, and the
safety of the arrestee. Where appropriate, law enforcement can divert a
mentally ill offender into a temporary crisis bed instead of jail.26 Without
access to mental health information, however, officials might not know if the
erratic behavior presented is the result of mental illness or intoxication by drugs
and/or alcohol. Information at this early stage is critical: mentally ill people in
the criminal justice system suffer greater rates of victimization and poorer
health outcomes, resulting in needless suffering and needless state expense.
27
22. See California Prison Health Care Services, http://www.cphcs.ca.gov/ (last visited
Oct. 30,2009).
23. This was the thinking behind Senate Bill 618, a plan to tie local assessments with a
comprehensive treatment plan that would provide some measure of continuity and
consistency in offender programming. See S.B. 618 § l(b), 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005)
(enacted). Individual offenders had the incentive to participate in S.B. 618 because the time
saved from streamlined prison intake would come off their sentences. After S.B. 618 was
enacted, however, the medical receiver in charge of the provision of medical care in the
California state prison system mandated that all entrants to prison be screened, eliminating
this incentive and correspondingly decreasing the number of participants in the program. See
DARLANNE HOCTOR MULMAT ET AL., IMPROVING REENTRY FOR Ex-OFFENDERS IN SAN DIEGO
COUNTY: SB 618 FIRST ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT (2008), available at
http://www.sandag.orgluploads/publicationid/ publicationid 1358_7933.pdf.
24. See Theodore M. Hammet et al., Health-Related Issues in Prisoner Reentry, 47
CRIME & DELtNQ. 390 (2001).
25. Id. at 391.
26. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 2009) (allowing seventy-two-hour
psychiatric holding).
27. See W. David Ball, Mentally Ill Prisoners in the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (2007).
20101
HeinOnline -- 21 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 285 2010
STANFORD LAW& POLICY REVIEW
D. Transition, Release, and Community Supervision
Each individual offender is different, with a particular inventory of risks,
needs, and assets. When it comes to reentry, one size does not fit all. Some
offenders might have supportive family members; for others, the family might
be a source of stress or even a pathway into reoffending. A well-designed
reentry plan will take account of community resources such as pro-social
networks (e.g., faith community, families, mentors), access to housing,
neighborhood employment prospects, and access to mass transit. Because
successful reentry involves a variety of agencies providing a variety of
interventions, a PSR that contains social, criminal, and psychological history
can be of great use in planning and coordinating this activity. Parole officers
should have access to more than just an offender's criminal history.
Information about social, medical, educational, and treatment history can help
parole officers coordinate their supervision with the county and local social
service providers, helping parolees get housing, jobs, and schooling. 28 RNAs
can serve as a quick sorting mechanism so that officials can know, roughly,
which parolees need what kinds of attention.
RNAs can do more than just assess an individual's risks and needs,
however. They can also give decision-makers some baseline for measuring
what should happen in the average case. Knowing that an offender with a
particular score will generally recidivate a corresponding percentage of the time
means that programs which produce substantially higher recidivism rates might
need to be reevaluated, or that programs which produce substantially lower
rates might need to be rolled out more widely. Just knowing the "going
recidivism rate" for a particular risk profile might give judges, policymakers,
and officials political cover to allocate scarce resources more efficiently.
Currently there is a temptation to plan for the average reentrant as though he or
she presents above-average risk. RNAs are a reminder that some offenders are
necessarily lower risk than others: it is logically impossible that the average
offender can present an above-average risk. Having RNAs as a reasonable,
actuarial cover might free officials to allocate resources in a way that
acknowledges that average offenders pose average risks. Not every case is
exceptional. Not every failure is foreseeable. Given limited resources, some
parolees need more supervision and some will have to get less.
28. See generally FRED C. OSHER, SHORT-TERM STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE RE-ENTRY OF
JAIL POPULATIONS: EXPANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE APIC MODEL (2006), available at
http://www.urban.org/projects/reentry-roundtable/upload/osher _UI-paper.pdf (describing
the importance of RNAs, postrelease planning, identification of community resources, and
agency coordination in promoting offenders' successful transition from jail to community).
[Vol. 21:277
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E. Systemic Diagnoses and Accountability
Better data can help agencies perform existing tasks more efficiently, but
better data might also suggest entirely new insights about the criminal
population as a whole. Aggregating individual data streams from individual
agencies could give us a big picture overview of which individuals make up our
criminal population: what their offenses are, what their substance abuse issues
are, what their ages and educational levels are. Better data could also help
identify emerging trends earlier-say, gang activity in a particular geographic
area-enabling public safety agencies to respond earlier.
Big picture information could also help identify ineffective or less effective
interventions,29 and indicate where law enforcement might be fighting last
year's battles with this year's budget. In evaluating the evidence supporting
both new and existing programs, it is important to use similar burdens of proof.
Often a new approach or policy-say, rehabilitation-needs to justify itself
with evidence, while the current policy-say, incarceration-need not provide
any evidence of its success. Creating a culture of evidentiary support could
enable the public to examine both new and established policies with a more
critical eye.
Better information could also help with accountability, oversight, and
transparency. Agencies tend to measure what they manage and manage what
they measure. Tying agency operations to a particular benchmark means an
agency will focus on moving that benchmark. If an agency has better
information on recidivism for offenders-not just gross statistics, but statistics
breaking down risks, needs, interventions, and results-it can more easily shift
resources to where they generate the largest return on investment. In an
integrated system, the costs of generating and reporting this information will be
lower, since such information will already be collected and organized in the
ordinary course of business. In short, data integration can simultaneously make
better management and better citizen oversight easier.
In some cases, simply paying attention to processes-particularly tracking
when one agency or jurisdiction hands the offender off to another agency-
should yield insights into where efficiencies might be realized. The SCJC spent
one Executive Session focusing on an offender's first seventy-two hours of
29. One easy example of a counterintuitive result from criminology is what is known
as the risk principle. Giving a low-risk offender a treatment designed for high-risk offenders
can actually make her more likely to reoffend than simply giving her no treatment at all.
Thus, an intervention which is required to mitigate danger in some criminal populations can
make other parts of the population more dangerous. See Christopher Lowenkamp & Edward
Latessa, Understanding the Risk Principle: How and Why Correctional Interventions Can
Harm Low-Risk Offenders, in ToPics IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS: ANNUAL ISSUE 2004:
ASSESSMENT ISSUES FOR MANAGERS 3 (Nat'l Inst. of Corr., U.S. Dep't of Justice ed., 2004),
available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2004/period266.pdf.
20101
HeinOnline -- 21 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 287 2010
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW
release from prison.3 Using those first three days as a framing device, we
learned a great deal about which organizational and informational problems
need to be solved. There has been no systemic effort to figure out obvious
solutions to obvious problems, such as how prisoners can best be transported
from prison to their home communities. Currently, we put them on the bus and
hope for the best, even though a substantial number of reentrants abscond from
parole before they even make it home. On an even more basic level, prison
officials often fail to share updated release information with family members of
the incarcerated. The result is that family members often arrive at prison only to
discover that their relative's release was postponed. This not only wastes the
family's time and money-diminishing what are sure to be scarce resources-
but it's also counterproductive. Offenders do better when they return with their
families and don't have to run the gauntlet at the local bus station. Making
family notification more effective would cost very little money; moreover,
making these mistakes serves no public-safety purpose. The point behind using
information is to avoid problems exactly like these: where knowledge can save
time and money-and improve results-without much expense.
Collected data could also pinpoint where an offender's reentry breaks
down. In other words, we should not just record the fact of failure, but the
factors that led to it, whether it's a relapse into substance abuse, gang
affiliations, lack of employment, or something else. Getting this information
can help policymakers refine approaches to particular offenders. Especially
with parole revocation, officials need to know what was working as well as
what wasn't so that subsequent prison time can shore up weak points and
reinforce strengths. Failure can happen for a variety of reasons, and the
response to parole revocation should take account of them. Prison reception
centers are already overwhelmed by the volume of revoked parolees (around
70,000 per year)31 and at present have time to do little more than perform
intake on the prisoner and release him after his three-to-four month parole
revocation stint is up.32 Information transmittal might shorten the processing
30. See W. DAVID BALL ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STANFORD LAW
SCH., THE FIRST 72 HOURS OF RE-ENTRY: SEIZING THE MOMENT OF RELEASE (2008),
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/scjc/pdf/Seizing.the_Moment-Release_09120
8.pdf.
31. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., RATE OF FELON PAROLEES
RETURNED TO CALIFORNIA PRISONS CALENDAR YEAR 2008, at 1 tbl.1 (2009), available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderInformationServices_-Branch/Annuall
PVRET2/PVRET2d2008.pdf.
32. Revocation-time reports have been indefinitely suspended "[d]ue to problems with
the Revocation Scheduling and Tracking System." California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Offender Information Reports, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
ReportsResearch/Offender_Information_ServicesBranch/OffenderInformation_
Reports.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). However, CDCR estimates indicate that the
average term served for parole revocation is 3.8 months. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
SPRING 2009 ADULT POPULATION PROJECTIONS 12 (2009), available at
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time in prison to at least allow prisons to attempt remedial programming which
addresses the underlying cause of revocation.
Above all, agencies will have to be open to the possibility that the things
they learn could really surprise them. For example, several jurisdictions within
California and elsewhere have learned that evidence supporting the efficacy of
some programs was, in fact, the result of the system losing track of offenders.
In one instance, a county learned that around twenty percent of its "wins" in
recidivism were due to the offender moving outside the county. Other "wins"
were due to offender mortality: a dead parolee, after all, does not get rearrested.
In the short-term, then, more data might give us a more pessimistic picture of
the efficacy of current programs. Agencies must prepare for these kinds of
findings to emerge.
II. OUT OF MANY, ONE
Part I detailed potential public safety benefits that might accrue as a result
of integrated criminal justice, but, as Yogi Berra once said, "In theory there's
no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is."33 While there
are some technical barriers to integration (wiring up network connections,
reprogramming databases, and the like), this Part will focus on organizational
and political problems that are both more difficult to solve and of greater
general interest. Crime is an inherently interagency and interjurisdictional
problem; the issue is not whether effective policies require information sharing
and operational collaboration-they do-but how that integration can be
optimized.
Some of this discussion involves factors peculiar to California, particularly
the tension between state and local governments and the chewing-gum-and-
chicken-wire system of state and local finance that has developed in the wake
of ballot initiatives limiting the state's ability to tax and spend. Much of what
the SCJC learned in the criminal justice context, however, has wider
application for other network government problems, such as health care and
environmental protection, problems which cross jurisdictional and agency lines
and require information sharing and operational collaboration.
In this Part, I discuss three organizational and political challenges to
criminal justice integration: (1) creating a virtual criminal justice system from
hundreds of constituent agencies, (2) defining individual networks when many
are possible, and (3) creating common ground between California's estranged
state and local governments.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports-Research/OffenderInformation_Services-Branch/Projectio
ns/S09Pub.pdf.
33. DIFFERENTIATING: WEBSTER'S QUOTATIONS, FACTS AND PHRASES 2 (2008).
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A. Creating a Criminal Justice System Out of Many Different Parts
Even though the phrase "the criminal justice system" is part of everyday
language, it's inaccurate. There is no single criminal justice system, just a
bunch of different agencies, many of which only intermittently communicate
and coordinate with each other. Integrating these components is not so much a
technological issue as an organizational one.34 Throughout our Executive
Sessions discussions, we found that many agencies don't focus on who will
have jurisdiction over the offender once they have released him. Each is
focused primarily on the job in front of it. There is thus a tremendous
opportunity to get criminal justice employees to think about-and plan for-the
ways in which the information they generate and the offender interventions
they make can be coordinated with and reused by subsequent agencies.
35
Offender programming requires up-to-date information and consistency in
approach. Programming is an ongoing process-it neither starts when an
agency receives an offender nor ends when an agency releases him. Agencies
need to know what has already happened to an offender and what will happen
to him next, always asking how their interventions relate to other parts of the
system. How does a program match up with what's coming next-is the
prison's approach to anger management, for example, going to be consistent
with the parole agency's? Is an offender's job training supported by
opportunities in his home community's economy? Is the agency getting
feedback about how its interventions work down the line? Is the agency giving
feedback about how well-prepared the offender was when he came to them?
Participants in the Executive Sessions generally agreed that there was far too
little discussion of the whole "life cycle" of an offender's participation in the
criminal justice system, and that agencies needed to think more about the big
picture, not just their part of it.
Of course, agencies do exchange some criminal justice information now,
but this exchange is not as efficient or effective as it could be. Typically,
someone has "her person" in another agency that she can call when she needs
to find something out. While an ad hoc approach might work for individuals, it
doesn't scale. Staff turnover could potentially cut interagency ties, or vacation
days might interfere with a given exchange. In a system that depends on
34. The National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) is taking the lead in
developing interoperable data standards, so that systems which use different labels can
translate those into a common language comprehensible to all other participating systems.
See National Information Exchange Model, What Is NIEM?, http://www.niem.govl
whatlsNiem.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
35. Ironically, Executive Sessions participants often complained about how little
information they received from agencies that had custody of offenders prior to them. In other
words, agencies were aware of how much they needed information from upstream agencies
but failed to devote serious attention and resources to pushing their own information to
downstream agencies.
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personal contacts, you can only call the people you know and only give
information to people who call you. Task forces organized around specific
problems can facilitate agency-level exchange, but their subject-matter domain
is limited and their organization impermanent. A more systematic approach to
information exchange would allow individuals and agencies to send out
valuable information to any present and future users who ask for it. Similarly,
individuals and agencies could send out generalized requests to get information
from users they don't know. Pennsylvania allows agencies to "publish"
information-not to a specific person it knows, but to anyone who wants to
subscribe to alerts about, say, gang members who are released from prison.
6
Putting information sharing on a permanent agency-to-agency level increases
the efficiency of the transfer.
Some of the organizational barriers to integrated criminal justice have to do
with the way agency budgets are structured and the way jobs are defined.
Agencies and individuals are not rewarded for the ways in which they help
others. Because sharing information and coordinating activities uses resources,
failure to reward these activities will result in underinvestment in them. It
doesn't help that budgets are based on public safety inputs (e.g., officers and
equipment), not public safety outcomes (e.g., the crime rate). If an agency uses
what it has more efficiently, it will typically not get to spend the money it saves
on making further improvements. Instead, it might see its budget cut. An
agency that uses all of its money-whether or not its expenditures have
improved public safety-will be more likely to maintain its level of funding.
Funding should, instead, be based on metrics that take the big picture into
account, such as improvements in the total rate of recidivism, or even pro-
social metrics like offenders' acquisition and retention of housing, jobs, and
stable relationships.
The funding problem is akin to a positive network externality: the value of
each piece of data increases as more relationships are made between it and
other data, just as the value of each node on a network increases with each
additional node. Much of the benefit to an individual's production of data is
realized "externally" by others. This phenomenon means that the system tends
to underinvest in data integration: any one actor in the system will focus only
on her individual costs and benefits, since she cannot realize "internally" the
benefits to other individuals and agencies. Without coordination or subsidy,
then, individual actors will not act in the larger interest of the system.3 7 We
need to figure out a way to "internalize" information dissemination as a way to
reward team players.
36. See PA. JUSTICE NETWORK, AN INTEGRATED JUSTICE PORTAL 3 (2009), available at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/document/655475/jnet-brochure-O9-pdf
37. It is less difficult to make the case to join an existing network, however, since new
entrants will gain the benefits of the information already in the system. The real problem is
how to populate a new network so that it achieves critical mass.
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One way to improve uptake of information sharing would be to pick low-
hanging fruit, where an agency could recoup its investment internally while
simultaneously saving money system-wide. Such improvements would save a
department's money and/or an individual's time while simultaneously saving
other agencies and jurisdictions their time and money. For example, courts can
save themselves money by requiring paperless filing, but paperless filing also
saves the money of everyone who needs to file in court. Even if state courts
were not interested in the networking benefits of a paperless system, it would
still make sense for them to implement it because the courts themselves will
save money and time. The California Case Management System (CCMS),
which will link all of California's courts electronically, is thus a natural
foundation to start building out a statewide information infrastructure. 38 Once
the CCMS is in place, individual agencies will find it in their own best interests
to join the network.39 The state could also impose a "regulatory tax"--i.e.,
refusing to accept paper filings in state courts-which would force other
agencies to invest in electronic filing capabilities.
In Orange County, the information-sharing "killer app" which saved
money both internally and systemically was court calendaring. Calendaring
court cases involves coordination among many different agencies: the sheriffs
who need to transfer defendants from jail to court, the judges who hear several
cases at a time, and law enforcement officers who need to testify. Orange
County agencies expended significant staff time and salary on these activities.
A "Witness Management Study" undertaken in 1997 by the Integrated Law &
Justice Project (ILJ) demonstrated how much money agencies were wasting
on officers who spent all day in court only to have to return another day to give
their testimony. The study concluded that while $5 million in 1995 dollars was
spent by law enforcement on court overtime, only one to two percent of those
personnel ever actually testified as a result of those costs.
41
38. As noted supra note 15, existing statewide databases are centralized, walled-off
systems that track a limited number of variables. The CCMS tracks a many more variables
and is architecturally more conducive to networking with a variety of agencies and
supporting search and automated distribution across a variety of variables.
39. Once a network has a critical number of nodes, new entrants reap the benefits of
all prior entrants more readily. This is why buying the first telephone in the world was of
little use, but buying a telephone today allows you to reach the billions of telephone users
who bought their phones before you.
40. The ILJ was the forerunner to the Integrated Law & Justice Agency of Orange
County (ILJAOC) discussed infra in note 61 and accompanying text. The ILJ studied the
integrated criminal justice problem in a nonbinding way; its conclusions led to the formation
of the ILJAOC, a binding Joint Powers Authority. See Agenda Report from Costa Mesa
Police Department to City Council 1 (Feb. 21, 2006), available at http://www.ci.costa-
mesa.ca.us/council/agenda/2006-02-21/022106%2OJoint%/20Powers%20Agreement%20
ILJ.pdf.
41. Id. This amount did not cover the on-duty hours that were wasted by other law
enforcement officials who were required to be in court.
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The ILJ worked with member agencies to realign trial calendaring times in
the court to prevent the scheduling of appearances before they were necessary,
and it also developed an electronic subpoena system and an electronic
scheduling system for use by all member law enforcement agencies. Both
systems are now connected to the District Attorney's case management system
to allow the District Attorney's staff to query an officer's availability
automatically before issuing a subpoena. The scheduling system will soon be
integrated with the court's calendaring system, and the final step in the project
will be a real-time cancellation feature which will allow officers to be notified
if they need not show up for court. As a result, the calendaring system upgraded
individual law enforcement agencies' calendaring systems, saved individual
officers and their departments time and money, and allowed the system as a
whole to calendar cases more quickly, easily, and efficiently. In essence, the
overall effort knit together courts, law enforcement, and the District Attorney,
and will allow other data integration projects to build out from there.
A more radical means of ensuring that positive externalities are fully
funded is to internalize them via some form of unified corrections, where one
agency with a single budget is responsible for jails, probation, prison, and
parole. A unified system creates incentives to do what's most cost-effective
overall, not just what maximizes an individual agency's budget. So if
probation, say, is a more cost-effective means of promoting public safety than
prison, a unified agency would drive resources there: the increased probation
costs would be more than offset by reduced prison costs, and the unified agency
would recoup the savings internally. Seven states have unified corrections:
Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, Vermont,42 and, most
recently, Maine.43 While most of them have populations much smaller than
California's, a recent California Corrections Independent Review panel
addressed the size issue by recommending the division of California into six
regions, each of which would unify corrections and parole and be responsible
for "preparing inmates for parole from the date of reception through release,"
including, inter alia, inmate programming, health care, community corrections,
coordination with local law enforcement, and coordination of community
services. 44 The legislature and the governor did not act on this
recommendation.
Even without unifying corrections, however, California could subsidize
practices with positive externalities. Counties currently have little financial
incentive to spend money on programs that divert offenders from prison: the
42. BARBARA KRAUTH, A REVIEW OF THE JAIL FUNCTION WIT-IN STATE UNIFIED
CORRECTIONS SYSTEMS 2 (1997), available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/1997/014024.pdf.
43. See Act effective Apr. 18, 2008, 2009 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 653 (West).
44. CORR. INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, REFORMING CORRECTIONS: REPORT OF THE
CORRECTIONS INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL 14 (2004), available at http://cpr.ca.gov/
Review_Panel/pdf/introto6.pdf.
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state pays for prison, but in-county dispositions like probation and/or treatment
come out of county budgets.45 If front-end investments like probation reduce
costs as a whole (through decreased prison costs and decreases in future rates
of criminality), the state should subsidize them. In 1945, the state had such a
program, subsidizing half of county expenditures on probation.46 In 1965, the
state enacted the California Probation Subsidy Act,47 which gave counties
$4,000 for each convicted offender not sentenced to prison,48 but the subsidy
was eventually phased out in 1978.49 The state Department of Juvenile Justice
reintroduced a similar program in 1996, charging counties per offender sent to
state facilities, and charging more for offenders with less serious offenses.
50
This gave counties an incentive to deal with lower risk offenders in the county,
while still providing state facilities for the most serious offenders.
B. The Many Ways to Define a Network
Raising the issue of unified regional corrections begs the question of how
regions should be drawn. Criminal activity does not limit itself geographically,
and, often, geographic or governmental limits artificially divide criminal justice
"ecosystems." Consider the San Francisco Peninsula. Political boundaries are
drawn east to west; each county has a rural corridor bordering Highway 1 on
the coast and an urban corridor bordering Highway 101. The urban parts of
each county arguably have more in common with each other than with their
corresponding rural parts, and any attempt to share information and coordinate
activity should take this into account. Consider another map, this one of the
areas of the Bay Area connected by the BART subway system. These areas
encompass several counties and municipalities, but each area likely contains
spheres of related criminal activity.
The county, then, is not necessarily the optimal criminal justice organizing
unit, especially if we think functionally in terms of geography, population
45. This is somewhat of an oversimplification, given the structure of statewide revenue
collection and subsidies to counties, but detailing fully the nature of state and local finances
in California is a monumental (perhaps impossible) undertaking that would exceed the scope
of this article.
46. MARCUS NIETO, CAL. STATE LIBRARY, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION IN
CALIFORNIA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 8 (1996), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/
crb/96/06/96006.pdf. For a more in-depth discussion of this history, see Kara Dansky,
Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REv. 45, 63, 70 (2008).
47. See John P. Conrad, Corrections and Simple Justice, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 208, 211 (1973).
48. NIETO, supra note 46, at 8.
49. Dansky, supra note 46, at 70.
50. See Juvenile Offender Realignment: What Makes a Successful Juvenile Justice
System?: Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 4 on State Administration, General Government,
Judicial and Transportation of the S. Budget and Fiscal Review Comm., 2007-2008 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2007).
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density, transportation corridors, and the like. On some levels, though, the
county is a prime candidate: counties tend to have one budget, and the sheriff's
authority extends throughout the county and involves both policing and jails.
So for some criminal justice purposes, it makes sense to think about counties,
but in other ways it might not. Criminal justice agencies should think creatively
about who their optimal sharing parties are in terms of common sense
questions-where the benefits of sharing are most evident. They need not limit
themselves to formal jurisdictional boundaries.
Another possible organizing principle would be to draw networks based
around individuals: every agency with jurisdiction over a particular offender
could share information irrespective of geography or jurisdiction. Agencies
could coordinate around an individual treatment plan which might involve
probation, parole, county mental health, the Department of Veterans' Affairs,
courts (especially mental health and drug courts), substance abuse treatment,
and/or nonprofit community-based organizations (CBOs). It is clear that
successful reentry, for example, requires intervention and monitoring on a wide
variety of fronts, and that stresses in one area-say loss of employment or
housing-can affect another-say likelihood of self-medication through drugs
or a return to criminal activity.
l
Networks could also encompass particular events. In our session on the
first seventy-two hours of release, for example, we artificially divided the
discussion into three parts: before the first seventy-two hours, during the first
seventy-two hours, and after the first seventy-two hours. Even the notion of
seventy-two hours itself, however, implies an easy division that is not really
there. Although it is useful to focus on the first few days of reentry, all
preparation should be leading up to the first seventy-two hours, and all follow-
through should lead from it.
Networks could, finally, be drawn around classes of offenders based on
their status or risk profile-say all eighteen to thirty-six year olds on some form
of community release. Even this distinction would artificially divide what is, in
fact, a continuum. Some offenders present greater risk than others and might
require qualitatively different kinds of coordination. Community release itself
includes those released on their own recognizance, those on probation, those on
parole, and those who cycle in and out of jail regularly, all of whom will have
both material similarities (relatively low level of risk and offense) and material
differences (resources, needed interventions).
The point of this discussion is not to suggest that nothing can be done or
known, but to acknowledge that there is no single way to divide either the
criminal justice system or its population of offenders. What this means is that
any integrated criminal justice system will have to be flexible-able to
51. For an analysis of how these issues might play out with mentally ill parolees, see
Ball, supra note 27, at 21-30.
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accommodate multiple ways of slicing the data and able to incorporate and
share data with multiple partners, depending on the particular issue, population,
or criminal ecosystem at hand. 2 Just as data should be entered with the idea
that it will be reused by multiple users in multiple contexts, any integration of
criminal justice itself must be designed with a multitude of users in multiple
contexts in mind.
One way of handling the problem would, of course, be to make everything
part of a statewide network-to centralize more fully-but this might be a bad
idea for a number of reasons. California's state and local governments do not
trust each other.5 3 The agencies involved in creating statewide databases might
not be receptive to local interests or local variations in population or policy.
Agencies are also more reluctant to collaborate as the size of the organization
increases-their reluctance to hand over control to a group increases as their
share of decision-making authority decreases.
Pennsylvania has pursued a different approach-what one might call a
"middleware" strategy of integration. 54 It has not imposed a single standard on
any participating agency; instead, it seeks simply to provide the networking
architecture between and among agencies. Everyone in the Pennsylvania
system speaks a common-but non-native-language. Counties are the
organizing link: the state communicates with the counties and the counties
communicate with all local agencies within their geographic boundaries.
Counties have built up their capacities in ways that make local sense, while, at
the same time, the state as a whole has used counties to shape statewide
policies without needing to manage an unworkable number of agency
relationships.
Unfortunately, California's system is not as flexible. The foundation of
California's information system--CLETS-predates the Internet, and while
this means that the state was far ahead of much of the country at the time of its
implementation, other states have been able to come to the game later and
apply Internet thinking to the design of their systems. California's databases are
largely siloed, accessible only through one-use-only machines, not general-use
computers. Hardware-based security means that access to information is secure
and controlled, but it is not as adaptable or interoperable. Instead of a single
building with a few locked doors, the state has, instead, chosen to build
different locked buildings, each of which has a single room with the relevant
52. It should also accommodate any security concerns: CBOs might need to know
certain criminal justice information and might be barred by statute or regulation from
knowing other kinds of information.
53. See infra Part II.C.
54. See PA. JUSTICE NETWORK, supra note 36, at 2. "Middleware," in the language of
information technology, refers to software and hardware used to connect and convert data
among end-user systems that use different programs, operating systems, and vendor
hardware.
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information in it. The state needs to move-and is moving-towards more
open architecture, so users can slice the data in many different ways. It is also
slowly implementing policies that acknowledge that control and security can be
maintained without physical restraints. But such moves are slow in coming, and
their implementation is hindered by the state and local tensions to which I now
turn.
C. California's Estranged State and Local Governments
Perhaps the most intractable obstacle to integration in California is that its
different layers of government-particularly state and local agencies-do not
work well together. In this Subpart, I will first discuss the scope of the tensions
between state and local agencies and then explore possible ways around this
problem.
1. The scope of distrust
Local agencies participating in the Executive Sessions did not, in general,
trust the state to hold up its end of any bargain. Local officials thought that the
state was, at best, unwieldy and inertial, and, at worst, that it did not really care
about the needs and opinions of local agencies. Many said that the state's role
was to dump unfunded mandates on them. For example, shortly before one
Executive Session, the California Legislative Analyst's Office suggested that
counties take over the supervision of low-risk parolees from the state." One
county-wide agency could then coordinate offender programming and
supervision, avoiding duplication of effort and potentially exploiting
administrative economies of scale. To our participants, however, the proposal
was dead on arrival. No local official trusted the state enough to seriously
entertain the issue, regardless of its merits. They simply felt that the state would
eventually cut funding, no matter what it had promised, and that realignment
was simply a way for the state to offload its parole responsibilities without
compensating the counties. This view is reflected in statewide local resistance
to community reentry facilities, which were a key part of the Assembly Bill 900
prison construction bill passed in 2007.56 The state has found it extremely
55. See ELIZABETH G. HILL, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, THE 2008-09 BUDGET:
PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES 131 (2008), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis 2008/
2008_pandi/pandi_08.pdf.
56. See James E. Tilton, Editorial, Investing in Prison Reform Pays in Safety,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 15, 2008, at B7 (then-California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation Secretary describing Assembly Bill 900). For an example of local opposition
to community facilities, see Stephen Frank, Ventura County Officials Send Letter of
Opposition to Prison Czar Kelso, VENTURA COUNTY STAR FRANKLY SPEAKING BLOG (Oct.
23, 2008, 3:42 PM), http://blogs.venturacountystar.com/frankly-speaking/2008/10/ventura-
county-officials-send.html.
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difficult to find a locality willing to house reentering offenders.
Some Executive Sessions participants declared that the state was not
capable of leading: it cannot engage an issue without taking it over, and it
cannot be a coequal partner to the counties without eventually dictating and
dominating. Some local officials described the state as "broken," particularly
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). The
CDCR's overpopulation and healthcare problems have been well-publicized,
but its information management systems are also grossly deficient. The CDCR
combines a perfect storm of antiquated information infrastructure with a high-
volume, high-needs, high-turnover population. There are more than 170,000
prisoners in the CDCR; a large number of these prisoners are transferred from
facility to facility every month. In addition to these prisoners, there are
thousands of parole revokees who enter and exit the system every month.
Simply keeping track of how many prisoners there are-and where they are-is
difficult. It is even more difficult to keep track of each prisoner's medical
history, programming needs, and disciplinary records. A recent report from the
California State Auditor concluded that the CDCR "fails to track, maintain, and
use data that would allow it to more effectively monitor and manage its
operations.",57 These deficits limit the CDCR's ability to control costs or to
analyze why costs are increasing. The CDCR has also failed to process and
track inmate educational data, and "therefore it is unable to determine the
success of its programs." 58 A new effort is underway to improve IT in the
CDCR, with a new Strategic Offender Management System that will integrate59
forty existing databases over the next four years, but this development comes
after years of inaction.
60
The degrees of local mistrust are ultimately as heterogeneous as the local
agencies themselves, but that heterogeneity is part of the phenomenon of
governing a state as large and diverse as California-what the SCJC began to
call "the problem of the average county." In California, it is nearly impossible
to design statewide programs that are equally useful (or equally applicable) to
57. BUREAU OF STATE AUDITS, CAL. STATE AUDITOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION: IT FAILS TO TRACK AND USE DATA THAT WOULD
ALLOW IT TO MORE EFFECTIVELY MONITOR AND MANAGE ITS OPERATIONS passim (2009),
available at http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfsreports/2009-107.1 .pdf.
58. Id. at v.
59. Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., CDCR Strategic Offender
Management System Project Will Automate and Streamline Information Sharing (Apr. 22,
2009), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/2009_Press_Releases/April_22.html.
60. See, e.g., LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, RECONSTRUCTING GOVERNMENT A REVIEW OF
THE GOVERNOR'S REORGANIZATION PLAN: REFORMING CALIFORNIA'S YOUTH AND ADULT
CORRECTIONAL AGENCY 22 (2005), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/179/
reportl79.pdf ("The departments in the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency do not have
comprehensive, integrated data systems to manage their correctional programs. CDC[R]
maintains multiple information systems that do not work together, are two decades old and
cannot be cost-effectively modified to meet current needs.").
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all counties. California's counties range from the rural and sparsely populated
Alpine to Los Angeles, the largest metropolitan area in the United States.
Somewhere in between are counties like Santa Clara and Orange, with affluent
populations over one million and technologically advanced criminal justice
networks. Santa Clara's County information exchange system, for example, has
900 different data points that can be transmitted to partner agencies. The
statewide CCMS will be able to track less than half of those variables. When
the state rolls out its mandatory system, Santa Clara will be losing capability.
One size will not fit all: smaller counties without any information sharing
capacity will gain from the rollout, midsized counties might lose capacity that
they already have, and Los Angeles will always be a county unto itself. Given
these disparities, the state might reconsider whether it wants to-or can-
design and implement integration policies at the statewide level. It could,
instead, distribute block grants to fund pilot programs, letting each county
decide for itself how to spend the money. Specifying how all counties spend all
money is a procrustean solution that makes no one happy.
Flexibility and decentralization are not without their problems, however.
How do we give flexibility to counties (or other local and regional actors)
without engendering anarchy? How can we make sure that counties maintain
standards? Is there a way to ensure some happy medium of healthy
collaboration? Here the state might have a very important role to play, ensuring
compliance with a set of guidelines, while respecting local expertise about how
to get there.
2. The future of state and local cooperation in California
The different layers of government within California can move forward,
provided that the state views itself as first among equals, not the boss of a
hierarchy. The state should recognize that law enforcement is an intensely
"boots on the ground" issue. Rather than seeking to control local efforts, the
state could support local initiatives. This might involve everything from
encouraging local and regional networking to providing a clearer regulatory
and statutory framework for it.
Regional information sharing networks might provide a buffer between
state and local governments, enabling data sharing while shielding local
agencies from excessive state control. In the world of information management
generally, networks grow as much as they are built, tending to organize
themselves and add members organically. Because local agencies are, in fact,
primarily responsible for law enforcement, it might make more sense for local
agencies to integrate criminal justice from the ground up, rather than have the
state impose integration from the top down. The state could acknowledge these
tendencies and, instead of dictating networks, let them emerge where data
transmission makes sense-not where it is forced.
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Sharing at the regional level already has a great deal of momentum behind
it. Local law enforcement, social services, and courts are increasingly
exchanging information, without waiting for a statewide program or the
imprimatur of other governments. Information sharing is a continuum: systems
can be rolled out, built piece by piece, and modified, and, as they grow, their
capacities and applications can grow along with them. There is no reason that
local, county, and metropolitan integration efforts can't proceed alongside one
another, provided there is some way of ensuring that each integrated system
can be combined into larger and larger wholes. Like a jigsaw puzzle, we can fit
individual pieces together in areas of similar color or shape, and then fit those
larger subgroups together into the finished whole. There is no reason not to get
started, even if we are unclear what the eventual picture in the completed
puzzle is going to look like.
Regional sharing can produce novel forms of government separate from
extant state or county governments. Orange County criminal justice agencies
have organized themselves by contract into a Joint Powers Authority (JPA)
known as the Integrated Law & Justice Agency for Orange County
(ILJAOC). 1 A JPA is basically a hybrid form of authority under California law
that isn't entirely geographical, county-based, or municipal. Using Coplink and
other technologies, courts, police departments, probation officers, and the
Sheriff share criminal justice information electronically. The ILJAOC's
member agencies vote on initiatives and finance them jointly. Every member
agency of the governing board has one vote, regardless of its size.62 According
to the ILJAOC's governance, approval of any budgetary action requires a 2/3
supermajority, so only programs with broad support are undertaken. 63 The
ILJAOC's funding is also distributed: each participating agency has the
responsibility to fund the ILJAOC on a shared, per capita basis and to
reimburse member agencies which provide personnel, equipment, and/or
services to the ILJAOC. 64 This form of government ensures that no one agency
dominates, and that any action the ILJAOC takes has broad support. The
distributed funding and staffing ensures that the ILJAOC is not an agency
sitting on top of its member organizations, but is instead an integrated part of
each of them.
The consensus among Executive Sessions participants was that the state
61. See JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT FOR INTEGRATED LAW & JUSTICE AGENCY FOR
ORANGE COUNTY (2008), available at http://www.ci.costa-mesa.ca.us/council/agenda/2008-
02-05/Amended%20JPA%20for/o20the%2OCity%20of%20COSTA%20MESA%2001
1708.pdf.
62. Six police chiefs elected by the local chiefs and sheriffs' association vote on behalf
of twenty-one member municipal police departments. The Sheriff's Department, which is
responsible for policing more than half of Orange County's million plus residents, also gets
just one vote. Id. § 3.02.
63. Id. § 3.07.
64. Id. § 4.06.
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should support local efforts to share information rather than force particular
schemes on local agencies. The state should be engaged, but not dictatorial;
deferential, but not absent. The state should exercise leadership by listening and
learning, and by supporting local and regional initiatives. State and local
officials need to come up with forms of state leadership that do not involve the
issuance of mandatory regulations and policies. "Thinking statewide" is not the
same thing as placing all authority in state government. For example, one
option might be to use existing statewide associations of sheriffs, police,
probation officers, and the like as a means of organizing the state's criminal
justice agencies without involving the apparatus of state government. These
statewide associations could be akin to a standing advisory board that sketches
out possible policy and program directions that local agencies might take.
The state could also encourage local agencies to migrate to a single
integrated system such as Coplink, and then ensure that state information
systems like CCMS map easily onto that system.65 One growth path for
information sharing in California might for local investigative agencies to
integrate via Coplink and state courts to integrate via the CCMS. Then, all that
would remain is making a single interface between Coplink and the CCMS.
Ultimately, the problems with criminal justice cannot be divorced from the
other problems facing California. State government has been increasingly
hindered in its ability to fund programs as a result of the limitations placed on it
by the proposition system-most notably, Prop 13's limitations on local
property taxes, which decoupled county expenditures from county-controlled
sources of revenue. Legislative term limits have also reduced legislators'
incentives and abilities to embark on projects with long-term payouts. Criminal
justice information sharing, like so many areas of criminal justice reform, is
65. This is, in fact, what is happening-the state is subsidizing local law
enforcement's purchase of Coplink licenses, and some local agencies have already moved
forward. See, e.g., Memorandum from Greg Munks, Sheriff of San Mateo County, to the
Honorable Bd. of Supervisors of San Mateo County, Implementation of an Integrated Law
Enforcement Sharing System (June 22, 2009), http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/bos.dir/
BosAgendas/agendas2009/Agenda2009O7O7/20090707_m_31.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
2009) (county sheriff's purchase of a Coplink license through a grant from the California
state Office of Homeland Security). Using its bargaining power, the state was able to get a
significant price reduction on both the cost of the licenses and the support contracts that
come with them. The plan is a welcome step in the right direction-it gets the state out of the
design and provision of IT, which is not its core competency-but it has some critics
worried. If the state is tied to Coplink, it might find itself subject to decreased bargaining
power when it comes time to renew the support contracts. Gillette, after all, made its money
by giving away razors and selling the blades. Perhaps Coplink wants to make its money by
subsidizing the licenses and making it up on support. Others question whether Coplink is
necessarily the best integration solution. A group of counties using the Automated Regional
Information Exchange System (ARIES) maintains that its solution is cheaper and more
powerful than Coplink. For more on the ARIES project, see Memorandum from Barbara J.
Miller, Team Leader, to members of the Judicial Council of Cal. (June 7, 2007), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.govjc/documents/reports/062907-JC-court-visits-report.pdf.
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one of those projects that requires a short-term increase in expenditures for
long-term returns.
66
Ill. INTEGRATION'S EFFECTS ON POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND PRINCIPLES
Agencies support criminal justice integration because it can help them
do their current jobs more effectively, but integration has the potential to
profoundly change the way these jobs are defined, done, and discussed. In this
Part, I discuss the ways in which integration can produce far-reaching effects
on criminal justice policies, processes, and principles. First, the seemingly
neutral decisions about what outcomes to measure can, in fact, affect what
policies are chosen to achieve these outcomes. Second, the act of measuring
itself can make criminal justice a more dynamic process, as policies generate
results and those results are then incorporated into new policies. Third, better
information about outcomes can more clearly isolate which policies are
designed to reduce risk and which are designed to promote punishment, leading
to better civic discussion about the goals of criminal justice policy.
A. The Policy Implications of Measurement
When we talk about measuring outcomes, the issue of how we define those
outcomes is more than just a question of labeling. Deciding what to measure
embeds certain policy frameworks within the measurements themselves. For
example, suppose one reentry program measures results using positive life
outcomes: improving job retention, educational attainment, and income levels.
A second program might, instead, measure results in terms of avoiding bad
outcomes: lowering rates of rearrest, for example. Even though both programs
measure factors relevant to successful reentry, the factors will, nonetheless,
promote different kinds of policies. A program that moves numbers on
employment might be very different than one that moves numbers on rearrest.
The second program might focus more on purely criminal and security-related
policies, perhaps emphasizing funding for unannounced searches of the
parolee's home, or providing more money for short jail terms as a means of
deterrence. The first program might focus more on education, job training, and
relationship skills.
67
66. For an interesting contrast, one participant noted that backers of criminal justice IT
investment in Minnesota made the case to the legislature by, in part, bringing business
leaders to testify about how common it was for private companies to invest heavily in
information technology and why these investments ultimately saved time and money.
67. There is another crucial point: the way in which differences in the way agencies
code similar information can change the outcome. In Pennsylvania, for example, different
agencies assigned different values to the term "effective date of sentence." In the courts,
effective date of sentence referred to the date the court ordered a sentence to begin (typically
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Discussions about data, then, do not avoid policy discussions, but they do
tend to postpone them-or cloak them-a bit. Data can be a plain envelope
wrapped around more contentious subjects, which helps get different
stakeholders to the table to hash out their substantive disagreements. Because
the topic itself is not as politically charged or suggestive of a particular
conclusion as, say, the phrase "sentencing reform," different groups of people
representing different perspectives were able to come to the Executive Sessions
without feeling like they had to defend or reject a particular agenda. At the
same time, because the concept of integration means so many different things,
participants had to work out exactly where they stood on the most pressing
issues in criminal justice. What should we be measuring? How is each part of
the criminal justice system related to other parts? And, perhaps most
importantly, when we talk about approaches which have evidentiary support,
what kind of evidence are we looking for? This meant, practically speaking,
that participants were talking about tractable subjects that were less prone to
political grandstanding, and yet the discussions about these subjects necessarily
shaped the ways in which rehabilitation, retribution, and reentry were discussed
and implemented.
Getting people to discuss collaborative criminal justice might, ultimately,
allow these conversations to take place in a less heated way. Collaboration
requires us to address questions about what we are collaborating on and to what
end. We all agree that the answer is public safety, but the nitty-gritty of what
public safety means-and how to get there-requires more concrete agreement.
In other words, rather than asking people to design their ideal criminal justice
system, which invites ideological conflict at a high level of abstraction, we
should ask how to improve this system. There is no way to discuss details
without touching on big picture issues, but starting with the details means that
the big picture discussion is of secondary importance. Big picture
disagreements are resolved as necessary, and only as they relate to concrete
decisions. That focus tends to result in more productive conversations.
B. Learning as a Process
As integration moves forward, criminal justice officials need to remember
that learning isn't something that ends. After all, CLETS used to be cutting
edge in the 1970s-the problem was the assumption that, over the next several
decades, innovation needed to go no further than CLETS. Any organization
should be built around capturing new information and incorporating it back into
the date of sentencing), but in county jails, effective date of sentence was the date the
individual was admitted to the county facility (which could be months earlier, if the
defendant did not post bail). These issues need to be worked out to ensure that like terms are
truly measuring like values.
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the system: learning is a process, not a product.68 Procedures can be refined,
and, as the offender population changes, resources can and should be shifted
accordingly. Learning is iterative; participants in an integrated system need to
be in continuous dialogue about the immediate work to be done and about ways
in which the system as a whole can be improved. Evidence-based practices
ultimately establish a feedback loop: we measure outcomes, we change policies
based on those outcomes, and then we continue to measure the outcomes of
new policies.
For example, looking at the huge numbers of parole revocations might
mean both focusing on immediate problems (transferring risk-needs and
programming information to and from prison, analyzing where parolees got off
track)69 and systemic ones (asking whether revocation to prison is an
appropriate response at all, as opposed to a graduated sanctions or harm
reduction approach). 70 Integration is not a cure-all, but a tool. Better data won't
make the decisions for us, but they will help us analyze the options.
Coordination among a broad network of agencies won't eliminate
disagreements, but it will ensure that all the stakeholders are at the table and
that some of them will establish working relationships with each other.
Information gathering itself needs to be ongoing. Assessments of people
and populations need to be updated frequently: risks and needs contain
dynamic factors that change. These reassessments can help diagnose which
interventions are working or perhaps suggest changes in programming for an
individual if, say, she has "solved" her remorse problem but needs more work
on addiction or anger management.
Ignorance can be bliss when it comes to analysis of systems, however. We
might learn that things are much worse than they seem, and, in the short term,
better measurement might mean that we end up with worse results-not
because things are getting worse, but because the prior estimates were overly
68. According to the Baldridge National Quality Program's 2009-10 Criteria for
Performance Excellence,
Learning needs to be embedded in the way your organization operates. This means that
learning (1) is a regular part of daily work; (2) is practiced at personal, work unit, and
organizational levels; (3) results in solving problems at their source ("root cause"); (4) is
focused on building and sharing knowledge throughout your organization; and (5) is driven
by opportunities to effect significant, meaningful change and to innovate.
BALDRIGE NAT'L QUALITY PROGRAM, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2009-10 CRITERIA FOR
PERFORMANCE EXCELLENCE 56 (2009), available at http://www.quality.nist.gov/PDFfiles/
2009_2010_BusinessNonprofitCriteria.pdf.
69. It is one thing to know whether a parolee succeeded or failed; it is another thing to
know why the parolee succeeded or failed. Reentry success is not binary, it's a spectrum. For
example, we might learn that housing was a factor in someone violating parole, but that the
parolee's substance abuse treatment was actually highly successful. If we disaggregate these
strands we can learn what programs and policies are working, even if they were not enough
by themselves to ensure that reentry as a whole succeeded. See Part I E, supra.
70. Ball, supra note 27, at 22-23, 31-32.
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optimistic. Right now we do not know the true scope of inefficiency in the
California criminal justice system. Policymakers should allow for some
readjustment of baselines and performance goals. As we learn more about the
limits of our operational knowledge, we can then readjust the yardsticks with
which we measure outcomes.
Ultimately, this focus on measuring outcomes and improving business
practices can yield system-wide insights: the difference between ground-level
and birds-eye views is smaller than one might think. Focusing on really
granular issues in depth raises questions about the ways in which reengineering
processes can generate the kinds of systemic benefits we normally associate
with broad policy changes. Just getting agencies to think about who might need
to reuse the information they produce-and getting these same agencies to
provide feedback to the agencies whose information they reuse-can uncover
potential efficiencies that would otherwise go unnoticed. Indeed, one might
even say that without focusing on the ground level, we can't know what needs
to be improved. Are agencies able to comply with state regulations in full or do
resource constraints require them to focus on other issues? Are policy
improvements designed with the current staffing, workflow, and training in
mind? And what good does it do to suggest improvements to existing processes
if we don't know how they work now?
C. The Tension Between Public Safety and Punishment
Data is largely focused on measurement of risk. Risk measurement focuses
on discrete outcomes and/or the actuarial probabilities of each outcome
occurring. The problem is that there is another, perhaps more dominant, part of
criminal justice that has nothing to do with discrete outcomes or probability:
punishment. Punishment cannot be measured in the same way risk can. One can
assign risk to different variables, but one cannot say with equal clarity what
punishment a given action deserves. Because punishment, not risk, largely
drives current criminal justice decision-making, better data integration might
not be able to change criminal justice without first reorienting the system away
from punishment and towards risk reduction.
Currently, the seriousness of the crime-what we would normally associate
with desert--drives decisions about offenders, even when a high-level offender
poses a low risk to public safety. Consider a middle-aged woman who kills her
abusive husband in a fit of extreme emotional disturbance: her offense is grave,
but the risk she presents now that her abuser is dead might be low. Compare her
to a teenage boy charged with vandalism. Vandalism is a less serious offense
than murder, but the boy might present greater risks for future violent and
antisocial behavior. Do we incarcerate the vandal and let the abuse victim off
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with a lighter sentence? Yes, if public safety is our only goal.71 But if the goal
is to punish behavior, and to correlate offenses and punishments, we should
punish the murderer and give the vandal a lighter sentence. Both retribution and
rehabilitation are valid goals of criminal justice, but we are not used to thinking
about them separately. Data about public safety threats can help clarify our
discussions about the purpose of punishment, allowing us to more accurately
estimate the cost-and the opportunity cost---of punishment and sentencing.
72
Simply getting the criminal justice system to stop thinking about offense levels
as proxies for risk and to start thinking about risk on its own would involve far-
reaching changes, 73 but these changes would make the purpose of a given
sentence much clearer.
Law enforcement officials also face the difficulty of trying to achieve two
different goals. Law enforcement's primary goal is to promote public safety,
and while successful reentry and criminal desistance are key components of
long-term public safety, law enforcement typically analyzes a given situation in
terms of how to avoid the worst risk to the public, not how to achieve the best
outcome for the offender. One Executive Sessions participant said it was
"inherently schizophrenic" for law enforcement to view parolees both as people
capable of all manner of latent threats and as people who have done their time
and are capable of change. Thinking of parolees as both law-breakers-threats
to guard against-and partners in rehabilitation is difficult to conceptualize,
much less operationalize.
Here information sharing might help by adding new topics to public
discussions about criminal justice. Choosing to measure something is a way of
bringing it into the conversation. Measuring data relevant to criminal desistance
could, in the end, help reframe the discussion about what public safety is. Is
public safety just a synonym for punishment, involving only the investigation
and prosecution of crimes, or does it also require investments in mental health,
71. Mentally ill offenders are another example of a high risk/low offense population.
These offenders are typically charged with nuisance crimes (e.g., drunk and disorderly) but
might threaten public safety.
72. We could obviously incarcerate both the battered woman and the teenage vandal,
but California is currently learning the hard way that there are budgetary and constitutional
limits to the "all you can eat" school of sentencing policy.
73. Consider bail. Bail itself cannot be punitive, because it is set for an offender who
has been charged, but not yet convicted, of a crime. We do not punish without a criminal
conviction or plea. Accordingly, the level of bail is supposed to serve two goals: ensuring
that the individual will appear in court, or, if no bail is given, quarantining dangerous
offenders to protect the community. Both of these are pure public safety, risk-based
assessments. But bail in California is not based on the risks and needs of the individual
offender, but on a uniform schedule that looks only at the offense charged. That is, offense
level is used to measure risk even where risk might be more accurately measured by, say, an
RNA. This mixes the seriousness of the offense-what we might associate with its
retributive blameworthiness level-with the risk the offender poses. The system now doesn't
do a good job of separating the two.
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or education, or parenting skills classes? Changing the discussion about what
long-term public safety means, and landing on a definition that includes
successful long-term risk reduction, might shift priorities in the rest of the
criminal justice system as well. If we start to isolate the public safety and
punishment components of given policies, we might not necessarily change our
decision that an offender deserves the punishment he is getting, but we will at
least be able to discuss whether, on average, the intervention he is getting is
going to make us safer or not. We can then make our decisions knowing what
we are getting for our time and resources, open-eyed about whether we're
doing something because it's effective or because we feel that it's the right
thing to do.
Ultimately, though, the problem might be intrinsic to the adversarial nature
of criminal justice. In the public health realm, for example, no one advocates on
behalf of a disease-all parties want to reduce threats to health, and
disagreements tend to focus on the most effective means of neutralizing those
threats. Our criminal justice system, on the other hand, is inherently
oppositional. Each participant represents a given point of view: an individual is
pitted against "the people," and the system seeks to preserve individual rights
via fair procedures, even if that means an individual wrongdoer might go
unpunished. Given the adversarial nature of our system, then, it might make
sense for a defense attorney to oppose assessment-based decision-making-
even when it would result in speedy access to treatment and a better, healthier
client-because it might later serve as the basis for a sentence enhancement or
a civil commitment. We have a punitive system; we do not have a rehabilitative
system. As long as that is the case, collaboration on the basis of risk reduction
is going to be difficult.
CONCLUSION
Having discussed some of the big-picture issues involved in integrated
criminal justice, one question remains unanswered: how do we get there from
here? One of the impediments to moving forward has been uncertainty about
the legal and regulatory environment surrounding the sharing of information.
There is a great deal of uncertainty-and caution--at the local level about
privacy and liability. A myriad of privacy laws potentially covers the exchange
of information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA) covers medical information (including information related to
mental health) and provides for substantial financial penalties for those who
unlawfully share medical information. 4 State laws prevent the unauthorized
disclosure of victims' information, while other laws require public access to
74. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 262(a), 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2006).
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public records. Individual agencies are reluctant to share information in a
climate of uncertainty: if I give information to you, I won't necessarily see the
benefit, but I might be the one whose head is on the line if something goes
wrong.
The SCJC has been contributing to this discussion by producing a "primer"
about the rules. Based on our research, the SCJC has produced A Legal Primer
for Criminal Justice Information Sharing: Confidentiality, Privilege, and
Disclosure Rules for Law Enforcement.75 Our preliminary conclusions are that
there are few novel liability issues that are generated in an integrated system.
That is not to say that agencies can integrate and relax: they will still have to
ensure that the information remains secure, but this is an existing obligation
that is just transferred to a new set of facts, not a new set of obligations. 76
One penultimate cautionary note is perhaps obvious, but it nevertheless
bears emphasizing: better information is a tool, and although it can be used to
make the case for or against a given policy, it cannot, by itself, make policy or
generate the resources necessary to fund those policies. For example, if an
offender is assessed and gets a particular risk score, that score will not
necessarily indicate what should be done with him or her. Those are policy
decisions. And even if the recommendation is to treat that offender's drug
addiction, that treatment needs to be available for the assessment to make any
material difference. Knowing, for example, that a large percentage of African-
Americans are in prison and that the majority of them have educational deficits
does not necessarily generate a policy response about education--or the
political will required to implement it. Data has the potential to take on a life of
its own-the "numbers say we need to do this"--but local agencies and
policymakers need to remember that they, not the information, decide what to
do with an offender who presents a particular level of risk. A risk assessment
tool can tell the policymakers the likely risk an offender poses to public safety,
but not whether society should or should not pay to avoid that risk. While data
won't make a decision by itself, using better information can move the
discussion away from the realm of the emotional and reactive and towards the
realm of the reasoned and evidence-based.
Finally, this Article has not discussed a crucial part of the integrated
criminal justice equation: its effects on privacy, net-widening, and profiling.
Citizens might be justifiably spooked by the amount of information available to
75. STANFORD CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A LEGAL PRIMER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INFORMATION SHARING: CONFIDENTIALITY, PRIVILEGE, AND DISCLOSURE RULES FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT (forthcoming 2010).
76. The main exception might be Brady obligations for the prosecution to disclose
exculpatory evidence. See id. As prosecutors become more tightly integrated with other
agencies, those agencies are more likely to be deemed part of the prosecution team. This
means that a prosecutor will be required to turn over exculpatory evidence from this team,
even if he or she has no actual knowledge of that information.
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criminal justice agencies; even if this information is already available as a
matter of public record, citizens might feel differently when they see it all put
together." We also might worry about the ways in which RNA tools might
enshrine preexisting racial disparities. 78 Clearly, much more work needs to be
done in this area, and I hope that this Article, by laying out the basic framework
of integrated criminal justice, will engender a serious and in-depth discussion
of these issues. My preliminary response to these concerns is that better
information lowers the costs of regulatory oversight. Rather than deciding not
to integrate information, we should instead give citizens access to that
information79 so they can examine what decisions are being made; whether
racial, ethnic, or religious factors overwhelm individual determinations of
suspicion and guilt; how much each practice and policy costs; and what kind of
return on criminal justice investment taxpayers are getting.
Information gathering and dissemination, then, should not stop with
criminal justice agencies-it should extend to the citizens of the State of
California, the very people whom the hardworking men and women in
California criminal justice agencies are striving to protect and to serve, by
keeping them better informed. Ultimately, giving citizens comprehensive,
detailed information about the policies and practices of criminal justice
agencies can promote more well-informed decisions, transparency about
existing practices, and better civic discussions about the purpose of criminal
law.
77. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 507
(2006) ("When analyzed, aggregated information can reveal new facts about a person that
she did not expect would be known about her when the original, isolated data was
collected.").
78. Age at first arrest and age at first commitment might be the result of disparate
racial treatment of similar behavior, for example, not intrinsic levels of risk. These risk
factors might still prove statistically significant, given the criminogenic nature of juvenile
and adult prisons, but this result might mask the underlying cause of those initial
commitments: racial profiling of youth by police, for example.
79. I am not proposing the release of individual records that would compromise
privacy-although there are very few individual privacy rights in records of arrest and
conviction. I am, instead, suggesting the release of aggregate statistics in a way that would
aid civic discussions about how criminal justice time and money is being spent, and with
what results.
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